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Econometrica, Vol. 56, No. 5 (September, 1988), 1085-1118 
RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS AND THE AGGREGATION OF DIVERSE 
INFORMATION IN LABORATORY SECURITY MARKETS 
BY CHARLES R. PLOTT AND SHYAM SUNDER1 
The idea that markets might aggregate and disseminate information and also resolve 
conflicts is central to the literature on decentralization (Hurwicz, 1972) and rational 
expectations (Lucas, 1972). We report on three series of experiments all of which were 
predicted to have performed identically by the theory of rational expectations. In two of 
the three series (one in which participants trade a complete set of Arrow-Debreu securities 
and a second in which all participants have identical preferences), double auction trading 
leads to efficient aggregation of diverse information and rational expectations equilibrium. 
Failure of the third series to exhibit such convergence demonstrates the importance of 
market institutions and trading instruments in achievement of equilibrium. 
KEywoRDs: Rational expectations, aggregation of information, efficiency of security 
markets, experimental economics, completeness of security market, dynamics of rational 
expectations equilibrium, efficiency of contingent-claims markets. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
IN THIS PAPER we explore the information aggregation properties of market 
organization that recent mathematical theorizing suggests might exist. Economists 
have long recognized that markets, if properly structured, can be an efficient 
conflict resolution device for a given pattern of attitudes. In addition, the idea 
that market processes may involve value formation (the endogenous formation of 
limit prices and demand functions), thereby departing from an assumption of 
fixed attitudes, was introduced many years ago. However, the idea that value 
formation, to the extent it reflects expectations formation, may involve aspects of 
efficiency and that organizations might aggregate and disseminate information 
while also resolving conflicts is a product of the modern mathematical literature 
on decentralization (Hurwicz, 1972) and on rational expectations (Lucas, 1972). 
That markets might reasonably be expected to efficiently resolve conflicts has 
been demonstrated many times in the experimental economics literature. Recent 
experiments (Forsythe, Palfrey, and Plott, 1982; and Plott and Sunder, 1982) 
have demonstrated that markets can also disseminate information efficiently. In 
this paper we address the more complicated and subtle issue of information 
aggregation when different traders have diverse information about an underlying 
state of nature. The situation is one in which no trader knows the state of nature 
but if traders pool their information, the state can be identified with certainty. 
Subject to the usual caveats about side-payments, the pooling of information 
would improve the welfare of all. Rational expectations models suggest that 
markets might be used to accomplish this result even though traders are unable to 
1 The authors gratefully acknowledge the financial support for this research which was provided by 
the National Science Foundation, Cal Tech Program for Enterprise and Public Policy, Indian 
Institute of Management at Ahmedabad, and the University of Minnesota. We have benefited from 
our discussions with Jim Jordan and detailed comments of two anonymous reviewers. We alone 
are responsible for the errors. 
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communicate information directly and even though traders have no obvious 
incentive unilaterally to reveal what they know. The experiments reported below 
explore the possibility. 
Previous experiments have demonstrated the power of the rational expectations 
(RE) model, so we began with the working (null) hypothesis that with replication 
the predictions of the rational expectations model would be reasonably accurate. 
The first experiments (Series A) led us to reject this idea and forced us to proceed 
on the opposite presumption that aggregation as suggested by the model does not 
occur at all. With this perspective a second set of experimental markets (Series B) 
in which a complete set of state-contingent securities were traded was designed. 
The information structure was exactly the same as it was in Series A. Our 
discovery that this second series of markets behaves substantially as predicted by 
the RE model led us to design a third series (Series C) of single compound 
security markets in which payoffs of a security in a state were identical across all 
traders. Again, the same information structure was retained. The fact that both 
the second and the third series perform as forecast by the RE model leads us to 
suspect that the existence of instruments which enable traders to link the actions 
of others to a source of motivation is important to the information aggregation 
function of markets. 
In the next section the experimental design, parameters, and procedures are 
introduced. The third section outlines a rational expectations model and two 
competing models which will help us organize the data. The data from all series 
are presented in the fourth section and analyzed in terms of the major predictions 
of the models about prices, allocations, profits, and efficiency. It also contains a 
discussion of aspects of behavior which may help in the development of a fully 
appropriate model. A fifth section contains a discussion of several parameters 
which may vary across experiments and our attempts to explain why the 
complete markets for state contingent securities seem better able to aggregate 
diverse information. The final section is a summary of conclusions. 
2. MARKET DESIGN 
A total of eleven markets (plus one pilot) were studied. Nine of the markets 
(1, 2, 3, and 6 through 11) involved a single asset. Six of these markets had 
diverse dividends (1, 2, 3, 6, 10, 11) and are labelled as Series A. The other three 
markets had uniform dividends (7, 8, 9) and are referenced as Series C. The other 
two markets (4 and 5) had a complete set of state-contingent claims during the 
first nine periods (labelled 4-CC and 5-CC) followed by several periods in which 
only a single compound security could be traded (labelled 4-S and 5-S). The 
contingent claims portions of these markets are referenced as Series B and the 
single security portions are grouped in Series A. The numerical indexing of the 
markets reflects the sequence in which the markets were conducted and to some 
extent the experience of subjects, but for purposes of analysis the markets will be 
rearranged as Series A, B, and C. 
Each market was conducted for several periods and in each period securities 
with one-period lives were traded. Each security paid a single dividend to the 
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holder at the end of the period. These dividends differed across traders (except in 
markets 7, 8, and 9) and depended upon the state of nature. The differences in 
dividends and in expectations about the underlying state of nature led to the 
existence of gains from trade similar to those induced by the differences in 
attitudes towards risk, wealth, and/or portfolio positions. The markets were 
organized as oral double auctions. Subjects were graduate and undergraduate 
students at three universities. Experience varied across markets as shown in 
Table I. 
2.1. Preferences and Assets 
Instructions, procedures for training subjects, the method of inducing prefer- 
ences, and other details of experimental procedure were like those used in Plott 
and Sunder (1982). Trader, i, was assigned a dollar redemption function of the 
form: 
Rt= Yi [ai + Edai(t)xti + EPs -EP t+ CI]C 
L s p 
ai <0, dai(ot) > 0 Yi > ,xtai>--0 
where i E X, the set of traders, a E 6, the set of types of securities, 0 E 6, the set 
of states of nature, Rt are dollar earnings of trader i in period t, xt, are units of 
security of type a held by trader i at the end of period t (end of period short 
sales were prohibited so x'i > 0), and they are equal to the initial endowment of 
securities plus purchases less sales in period t, d,,(Ot) is the dividend rate of type 
a security in francs for trader i expressed as a function of the state of nature 0, 
E2psIt is revenue from sales of securities during period t, E) 2pt is cost of securities 
purchased during period t, C/ is initial endowment of cash in francs, a' is fixed 
cost in francs (in all experiments we chose a =- Ct, so the entire working 
capital was taken away in term of fixed cost at the end of each period), and yi is 
the conversion rate of francs (experimental currency) into U.S. dollars. 
Traders who have positive utility for money would like R5 as large as possible. 
Derived demand induces values on securities which, in turn, can be used as 
parameters in the models of market behavior. 
Constraints on decisions of traders were as follows. At the beginning of each 
period each trader was given an initial endowment of working capital (Ct) which 
was sufficiently large never to be binding. Each trader was also given an initial 
endowment of securities (xa) of each type a. Short positions were permissible 
(in markets 4 though 11 but not in markets, 1, 2, or 3) during a trading period, 
but no one was allowed to remain short at the end of the period.2 Thus the 
supply of each type of security was fixed at ixtii. 
2A penalty of 300 francs plus the highest transaction price during the period was imposed for each 
short unit. Only once (market 4, period 9) did a trader end a period in a net short position. 
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TABLE I 
DESIGN 
OF 
MARKETS 
Expected 
Ditvidend, 
& 
Subject 
Trader 
of 
Fixed 
Cost 
Dollar 
E 
ov 
dend' 
Ptob,bdtte. 
No 
Not 
Not 
Not 
Market, 
Series 
Expenente
Type 
Trader, 
Certit,atc, 
Frano 
(Fran,,) 
per 
Fran,tt 
i 
t 
I 
Information 
x 
t 
: 
1 
A 
UC 
I 
4 
2 
10,000 
10,000 
0.003 
70 
160 
300 
0.35 
0.20 
0.45 
191.5 
257 
199 
103 
(inexperienced) 
II 
4 
2 
10,0  
10,0  
0.0 3 
230 
90 
60 
125.5 
69 
134 
179 
2 
A 
UC 
I 
4 
2 
10,00  
10,00  
0 
003 
100 
330 
190 
0.35 
0.45 
0 
20 
221.5 
287 
133 
229 
(experienced 
in 
II 
4 
2 
10,00  
10,00  
0.003 
260 
90 
120 
155.5 
99 
209 
164 
market 1 
or 
pilot) 
3 
A 
CIT 
I 
4 
2 
10,000 
10,000 
0.003 
70 
160 
300 
0.35 
0.20 
0 
45 
191.5 
257 
199 
103 
(inexperie ced) 
II 
4 
2 
10,00  
10,00  
0.003 
230 
90 
60 
125 
5 
69 
134 
179 
4 
CIT 
I 
4 
2 
10,00  
10,00  
0.003 
70 
130 
300 
0.35 
0.20 
0 
45 
185.
248 
199 
92 
(contingent 
claims 
(inexperi nc d) 
II 
4 
2 
10,0  
10,00  
0.0 3 
230 
90 
60 
125 5 
69 
134 
17  
periods 
1-9) 
B 
III 
4 
2 
10,00  
10,00  
0 
003 
100 
160 
200 
157 
0 
188 
156 
122 
(single 
security 
periods 
10-13) 
A 
S 
CIT 
I 
4 
2(4)b 
15,000 
15,000 
0.0025 
140 
260 
600 
1/3 
1/3 
1/3 
333 
430 
370 
200 
(contingent 
claims 
(experienced 
in 
II 
4 
2(4)h 
15,00  
15,00  
0.0025 
460 
180 
120 
25  
150 
290 
320 
periods 
1-9) 
B 
market 3 
or 
4) 
III 
4 
2(4)b 
15,00  
15,00  
0 
0025 
200 
320 
400 
307 
360 
300 
260 
(single 
security 
periods 
10-16) 
A 
6 
A 
CIT 
1 
4 
4 
16,000 
16,000 
0.00125 
50 
240 
590 
1/3 
1/3 
1/3 
293 
415 
320 
145 
(experienced 
in 
II 
4 
4 
16,00  
16,00  
0.00125 
170 
450 
110 
243 
280 
140 
310 
market 
3 
or 
4) 
III 
4 
4 
16,00  
16,00  
0.00125 
310 
190 
390 
297 
290 
350 
250 
7 
C 
IIM 
I 
12 
4 
25,000 
25,000 
0.0015' 
50 
240 
490 
1/3 
1/3 
1/3 
260 
365 
270 
145 
(inexperie ced) 
8 
C 
IIM 
I 
12 
2 
25,000 
25,000 
0.0015'. 
125 
375 
525 
1/3 
1/3 
1/3 
342 
450 
325 
250 
(experienced 
in 
market 
7) 
9 
C 
CIT 
I 
12 
4 
25,000 
25,000 
0.015 
50 
240 
490 
0 
35 
0.45 
0.20 
223 5 
317 
210 
157 
(inexperie ced) 
10 
A 
CIT 
I 
4 
4 
16,000 
16,000 
0.00125 
240 
50 
590 
1/3 
1/3 
1/3 
293 
320 
415 
145 
(experienced 
in 
II 
4 
4 
16,00  
16,00  
0 
00125 
450 
170 
110 
243 
140 
280 
310 
market 
9) 
III 
4 
4 
16,00  
16,00  
0.00125 
190 
310 
390 
297 
350 
290 
250 
11 
A 
IIM 
I 
4 
2 
16,000 
16,000 
0.00125' 
50 
240 
590 
1/3 
1/3 
1/3 
293 
415 
320 
145 
(experienc d 
in 
II 
4 
2 
16,00  
16,00  
0.00125' 
170 
450 
110 
243 
280 
140 
310 
market 
7 
& 
8) 
III 
4 
2 
16,00  
16,00 
0.001250 
310 
190 
390 
297 
290 
350 
250 
'UC 
is 
University 
of 
Chicago 
CIT 
ts 
Calftornia 
Institute 
of 
Technology 
tIM 
ts 
Indian 
Institute 
of 
Management 
h2 
in 
complete 
marketo 
(penods 
1-9),
4 
to 
single-socunty 
markets 
(penod'. 
10-16) 
'Rupee 
per 
franc 
for 
markets 
7. 
8, 
and 
II 
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2.2. Information 
The information structure of the markets was the same across all markets. 
Traders were publicly told that the selection of the state each period depended 
upon a draw from a bingo cage and they were trained through preliminary draws 
to guest the eVents which were to have led to various states of nature (see Plott 
and Sunder (1982) for procedures and instructions).3 
No subject knew the dividends of any other subject. The number of informed 
traders and the type of information were both public. The method of distributing 
information (based on a random number table) was public. 
In all cases there were three states x, y, and z(t9 = { x, y, z }). As outlined 
above we postulate that a probability distribution P(O), 0 E { x, y, z } represents 
the beliefs of all traders about the probability of the occurrence of each state in 
any period. At the beginning of the period the state was drawn. Information 
given to traders was as follows: if the state was, say, x, then half of the traders 
were told that the state was not y and the other half were told that the state was 
not z. Furthermore, all traders knew that the identity of the traders who received 
each clue was determined according to a random number table. That is, probabil- 
ity that any given trader receives the clue "not y," given that the state is x, is 
one-half, etc. 
2.3. Parameters 
The parameters for each experiment are contained in Table I. In the first three 
markets traders were partitioned into two types (designated I and II) according 
to dividend payoffs and, in 4, 5, 6, 10, and 11, three types (designated I, II, and 
III). In all these markets there were four traders of each type. Thus in each of the 
first three markets there were eight traders and in all other markets there were 
twelve. In markets 7, 8, and 9 there was only one type of trader but there were 
twelve traders of this type. Each period each trader had an initial endowment of 
two securities except in markets 5-S, 6, and 9 where each trader had four. The 
initial cash endowments given to traders each period, the fixed cost, and 
dollar/franc (or rupee/franc) exchange rate, are all listed in the table. The initial 
endowment and therefore the total supply of securities was doubled from market 
3 to see if volume of trading is a critical variable in convergence. 
The structure of dividends differed between the contingent claims and the 
single security organizations. The dividend paid at the end of a period on a single 
security depended on the state of nature for that period and the type of trader 
holding the security. For example, in period 10 of market 4 in which only a single 
security exists, a security held by, say, a type II trader yielded a dividend of 230 
3In fact, the state in all markets was picked from a predetermined sequence of draws made in 
advance of the experiment. Draws from the bingo cage were conducted each period and the 
proportions of states were the same as the stated probabilities but the announced states were those of 
the predetermined sequence. We have no evidence which leads us to suspect that subjects disbelieved 
the mechanism. 
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francs if the state was x, 90 francs if the state was y, and 60 francs if the state 
was z. The dividend returns to other types can also be read from Table I. 
The contingent claims markets had three different securities. For convenience 
the securities were called x, y, and z, i.e., C = { x, y, z }. The x securities yielded 
a positive dividend if x occurred and zero otherwise. The y security yielded a 
positive dividend if y occurred and zero otherwise, etc. For exam- 
ple, reading from Table I, dividends for a type II trader during period 1 of 
market 4-CC were the following: (d,i(x) = 230, d,i(y) = 0, d,i(z) = 0); 
(dy1(x) = 0, dyi(y) = 90, dyi(z) = 0); (d,i(x) = 0, d,i(y) = 0, d,,(z) = 60). A 
portfolio of one of each type of security is equivalent to a portfolio of one 
security in the single security markets. The dividend structure for all other traders 
can be determined similarly from Table I. 
3. COMPETING MODELS OF SECURITY BEHAVIOR 
Three models are examined as candidate explanations of the behavior of 
security markets. The project was motivated by the fully revealing rational 
expectations equilibrium (RE) in which beliefs are endogenously developed. The 
two other models, the prior information equilibrium (PI) and maximin (MM), 
utilize exogenously formed beliefs and both are known from other experiments 
(Plott and Sunder, 1982) to be less reliable than RE. They are used here as 
benchmarks against which to evaluate RE. In addition, both models could be 
used as starting points in dynamic models of formation of rational expectations; 
so both are of independent interest. 
3.1. Rational Expectations (RE) 
The central principle of this model is the fully revealing rational expectations 
hypothesis (RE): all traders choose in equilibrium as if they are aware of the 
pooled information of all traders in the system regarding the underlying state. 
This principle is supplemented with the standard principles of demand and 
supply as applied to competitive markets. 
Under these assumptions an RE equilibrium can be derived for the markets 
described in the section above. In all states the pooled information will identify 
the state with certainty (half of the traders can eliminate one of three states with 
certainty and the other half can eliminate another). Under competitive conditions 
demands are perfectly elastic at the dividend rate (assuming no transaction cost). 
The supply is fixed. 
The price and allocation predictions of this model for each market are listed in 
Table II in rows marked RE. In any given state the equilibrium price is the 
highest dividend in that state and the securities are held by the traders who have 
that high dividend potential. In market 1, for example, the rational expectations 
model predicts a price of 230 francs when the state is x and it also predicts that 
all securities will be held by type II traders. In market 4-CC the rational 
expectations model predicts, when the state is x, that the price of the x, y, and z 
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TABLE 
II 
PRICE 
AND 
ALLOCATION 
PREDICTIONS 
Price 
Type 
of 
Trader 
Purchasing 
Assets 
Diverse 
Information 
Diverse 
Information 
No 
about 
the 
State 
No 
about 
the 
State 
Market 
Model 
Information 
x 
y 
z 
Information 
x 
y 
z 
1 
and 
3 
RE 
191.5 
230 
160 
300 
I 
II 
I 
I 
(single 
security) 
PI 
19 .5 
199 
257 
257 
I 
I(not 
y) 
I(not 
x) 
II(not 
x) 
MM 
70 
90 
160 
160 
I 
II(not 
z) 
I(not 
x) 
I(not 
x) 
2 
RE 
221.5 
260 
330 
190 
I 
II 
I 
I 
(single 
security) 
PI 
221.5 
229 
287 
287 
I 
I(not 
z) 
I(not 
x) 
I(not 
x) 
MM 
100 
120 
190 
190 
I 
II(not 
y) 
I(not 
x) 
I(not 
x) 
4-CC 
RE 
(contingent 
claims) 
x-certificate 
80.5 
230 
0 
0 
II 
II 
- 
y-certificate 
32 
0 
16  
0 
III 
- 
III 
z-certificate 
135 
0 
0 
30  
I 
- 
- 
I 
PI 
x-certifica  
80.5 
146 
146 
101 
II 
II(not 
z) 
II(not 
z) 
II(not 
y) 
y-certificat  
32 
58 
58 
49 
III 
III(not 
z) 
III(not 
z) 
III(not 
x) 
z-certificate 
135 
169 
208 
208 
I 
I(not 
y) 
I(not 
x) 
I(not 
x) 
MM 
x-certificate 
0 
0 
0 
0 
y-certificate 
0 
0 
0 
0 
no 
predictions 
about 
allocations 
z-certificate 
0 
0 
0 
0 
4-S 
RE 
185.5 
230 
160 
300 
I 
II 
III 
I 
(single 
security) 
PI 
185.5 
199 
248 
248 
I 
I(not 
y) 
I(not 
x) 
I(not 
x) 
MM 
100 
100 
160 
160 
III 
III 
III(not 
x) 
III(not 
x) 
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5-CC 
RE 
(contingent 
claims) 
x-certificate 
153 
460 
0 
0 
II 
II 
- 
y-certificate 
107 
0 
32  
0 
III 
- 
III 
z-certificate 
200 
0 
0 
60  
I 
- 
- 
I 
PI 
x-certifica  
153 
230 
230 
230 
II 
II 
II(not 
z) 
II(not 
y) 
y-certificat  
107 
160 
160 
160 
III 
III(not 
z) 
III 
III(not 
z) 
z-certificate 
200 
300 
300 
300 
I 
I(not 
y) 
I(not 
x) 
I 
MM 
x-certifica  
0 
0 
0 
0 
y-certificat  
0 
0 
0 
0 
no 
prediction 
about 
allocations 
z-certificate 
0 
0 
0 
0 
5-S 
RE 
333 
46  
32  
60  
I 
II 
III 
I 
(single 
security) 
PI 
33  
370 
430 
430 
I 
I(not 
y) 
I(not 
x) 
I(not 
x) 
MM 
200 
200 
320 
320 
III 
III 
III(not 
x) 
III(not 
x) 
6 
and 
11 
RE 
297 
310 
450 
490 
III 
III 
II 
I 
(single 
security) 
PI 
297 
350 
415 
415 
III 
III(not 
y) 
I(not 
x) 
I(not 
x) 
MM 
190 
310 
240 
310 
III 
III(not 
y) 
I(not 
x) 
III(not 
y) 
7 
RE 
260 
50 
240 
590 
all 
(no 
trade) 
(uniform 
dividends 
PI 
260 
270 
365 
36  
all 
(no 
trade) 
not 
y 
not 
x 
not 
x 
single 
security) 
MM 
50 
50 
240 
240 
- 
all 
(no 
trade) 
not 
x 
not 
x 
8 
RE 
342 
125 
375 
525 
all 
(no 
trade) 
(uniform 
dividends 
PI 
342 
325 
450 
450 
all 
(no 
trade) 
not 
y 
not 
x 
not 
x 
single 
security) 
MM 
125 
125 
375 
375 
< 
all 
(no 
trade) 
not 
x 
not 
x 
9 
RE 
223.5 
50 
240 
490 
all 
(no 
trade) 
(uniform 
dividends 
PI 
223.5 
210 
317 
317 
all 
(no 
trade) 
not 
y 
not 
x 
not 
x 
single 
security) 
MM 
50 
50 
240 
240 
- 
all 
(no 
trade) 
not 
x 
not 
x 
10 
RE 
297 
450 
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securities well be 230, 0, and 0, respectively. All of the x securities would, 
according to this model, be held by type II traders and there should be no trades 
in the other two securities.4 In market 7, with all traders having identical 
dividends, RE implies prices of 50, 240, and 490 in states x, y, and z, 
respectively and no trading, leaving final allocations of securities the same as the 
initial endowments. 
3.2. Prior Information (PI) 
The prior information model is based on three principles of individual action. 
The first is that traders apply Bayes law to the problem of ascertaining the 
likelihood of a state after having received their private prior information. The 
second principle is that traders act on the probability so derived. The third 
principle is that actions are taken in accord with the expected utility hypothesis. 
(Here we make a further and stronger assumption that traders are risk neutral.) 
The law of supply and demand is then applied. Aside from the parametric 
structure the model is that developed by Lintner (1969) and applied to the U.S. 
securities market. 
For our experimental markets these axioms imply that the price of an asset 
will be equal to the expected value to the trader whose prior information about 
the state leads to the highest expected value across all traders. The model pre- 
dicts that these highest expected value traders will hold all of the securities. 
These predictions for each period and each state are listed in Table II on rows la- 
belled PI. 
3.3. Maximin (MM) 
The maximin model replaces the hypothesis regarding expectations formation 
of PI with the hypothesis that traders act only on certainty.5 This means that 
traders will not purchase a security unless the price is below the minimum they 
could possibly receive given their prior information. Thus the trader with the 
maximum (across all traders) of minimum (across all states) dividend will 
purchase the security and the competitive market hypothesis implies that the 
price will be equal to this dividend. The predictions of this model are listed in 
Table II on rows labelled MM. 
4. RESULTS 
Prices of the completed transactions in the relevant experimental markets are 
plotted chronologically in Figures 1 through 11. Horizontal lines in these figures 
4 Since the RE equilibrium price of y and z securities under state x is zero, the model actually 
makes no predictions about allocations. If we assume that the investors will not incur the pecuniary 
or psychological costs of conducting a transaction without expectation of gain from it, the zero trade 
prediction follows. Some evidence on reluctance of investors to enter trades which have zero expected 
benefit is available in the experimental literature (Plott and Smith, 1978). 
5One could interpret this as an alternative to the expected utility hypothesis as opposed to a 
difference in belief structures between the models. 
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indicate the predictions of the three models described above which can be 
compared to the actual results. Average transaction prices are also shown for 
each period. 
The conclusions developed below can be seen in the data presented in the 
figures. Market behavior relative to the predictions of the three models differs 
substantially depending upon treatment variables. The behaviors of the single 
security markets with diverse preferences (Series A) are only partially captured 
by the rational expectations model. A good example is market 10 in Figure 10. 
The early period prices are close to the MM predictions. Prices drift upward and 
remain about the same regardless of the state. If the markets are complete as in 
Series B or if preferences are identical (Series C), the rational expectations model 
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provides a reasonably accurate summary of market behavior. Market 4-CC in 
Figure 4 is one of the two contingent claims markets. Notice that after the initial 
period or two the market corresponding to the realized state is near the RE price 
and the other two "not-state" markets have prices near zero. With uniform 
dividend, market 7 is slower to attain RE prices but by period 11 they are being 
attained and in the other two uniform dividend markets, 8 and 9, the RE levels 
are attained very quickly. 
The discussion of results is divided into six subsections. Subsection 4.1 con- 
tains analysis relative to the equilibrium predictions of the three competing 
models. All models predict prices, allocations, and profits. Subsection 4.2 ad- 
dresses the central issue of information aggregation as reflected in market 
efficiency. In a third subsection, 4.3, the dynamics of the possible equilibrating 
process receive some attention and 4.4 extends the investigation of dynamics to 
the bids and offers in the contingent claims markets. Subsection 4.5 analyzes the 
data relative to the fair game hypothesis of security markets. The sixth subsec- 
tion, 4.6, addresses the possible effects of many variables which changed across 
the markets. Though these variables are not central to the major thesis of this 
study, we analyze them in search for institutional variables that may assist in 
aggregation of information. We have labelled as conjectures those results which 
are either suggested by the data or are based on very little data. In either case 
more data are needed for testing these conjectures. 
4.1. Equilibrium Behavior 
Earlier experiments have demonstrated that replication of periods is necessary 
for the data to approach the levels predicted by static equilibrium models. 
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Accordingly, only the last occurrence of each for the three states in each 
experimental market has been used to evaluate the possible equilibrium behavior.6 
The question about increased model accuracy upon even more replications 
remains open. 
Conclusion 1 (Price Level). In single security markets with diverse preferences 
(Series A) the price predictions of the rational expectations model do not perform 
well relative to the performance of the price predictions of PI or MM. Neither PI 
nor MM is distinguished as an overall "best model." 
Table III provides the supporting statistics. Three measurement criteria are 
presented. For Series A the mean absolute deviations of actual prices (during the 
last occurrence of each of the three states in each market) from the price 
predictions of the PI model are less than those for either of the other models. The 
RE model is significantly worse than PI on this criterion since its predictions 
have a lower mean absolute deviation than PI in only one of the eight relevant 
experiments and the predictions of the RE model are marginally worse than MM. 
If log odds are used, RE is significantly worse than both PI and MM since the 
data are never the most likely under RE. The third measure is the percent of price 
changes in the direction of the predicted price. With this measure MM is 
significantly worse than RE while PI is marginally better than RE. In summary, 
RE is worse than PI, and has mixed results with respect to MM. 
Conclusion 2 (Price Level). In markets with a complete set of state contingent 
securities (Series B) and in markets with a single security with uniform dividends 
(Series C) the RE model price predictions outperform both PI and MM. Further- 
more the RE model is more accurate in Series B and C than it is in Series A. 
Again, Table III contains the relevant measures. In the last periods of the 
contingent claims markets (Series B) and in the last periods of the uniform 
dividends markets (Series C) the price predictions of the RE model are signifi- 
cantly better than both PI and MM on two criteria (mean absolute deviation of 
price and log odds) and marginally better on the third criterion (percent of 
converging price changes). The RE model is unambiguously the best. 
The second part of the conclusion establishes the accuracy of the RE model in 
a sort of absolute sense by comparing its accuracy to the case in which it was 
performing badly relative to other models. The mean absolute deviations from 
the RE model in all markets in Series B and C, with the exception of market 
5-CC, are less than all markets in Series A, and in 5-CC the mean absolute 
deviation is better than all Series A markets except markets 1 and 2. Log odds are 
always better in Series B and C than in Series A. Percent of convergent price 
changes gives a less clear picture. 
Each model predicts a transfer of securities from some traders to others 
depending upon traders' dividends and the pattern of private information. The 
allocations predictions of the three models are in Table II. Notice that the traders 
6Rational expectations can be seen either as a static theory of markets (e.g., in the efficient market 
literature in finance) or as an end-point of a dynamic path of adjustment. Our previous work favors 
the second interpretation. We use the second interpretation here by restricting analysis to the last 
period data and thus giving the RE model its "best shot." 
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TABLE 
III 
COMPARISON 
OF 
ACTUAL 
PRICES 
TO 
PRICES 
PREDICTED 
BY 
THREE 
MODELS 
AT 
THE 
END 
OF 
EACH 
MARKETa 
Criteria 
Market 
Experiments 
Mean 
Absolute 
Deviation 
Log 
Odds 
under 
Normality 
Percentage 
of 
Convergent 
Price 
Changes 
Series 
Number 
PI 
RE 
MM 
PI 
RE 
MM 
PI 
RE 
MM 
1 
18 
54 
84 
-55 
- 
284 
-455 
82 
71 
18 
2 
26 
36 
81 
- 
85 
-102 
- 
373 
69 
57 
62 
3 
75 
72 
28 
-146 
- 
86 
-17 
50 
50 
50 
A 
4-S 
54 
67 
38 
- 
2482 
- 
74 2 
- 
5757 
70 
63 
30 
5-S 
94 
144 
38 
-4719 
-4509 
- 
344 
57 
57 
37 
6 
27 
105 
83 
-251 
- 
3429 
-652 
61 
54 
37 
10 
76 
134 
32 
-117  
- 
2715 
- 
547 
57 
66 
45 
11 
77 
114 
79 
-51  
- 
853 
-160 
56 
61 
39 
Summary 
Statistics, 
SeriesA 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
_ 
I 
T 
T 
_ 
I 
Wilcoxon 
Signed 
I 
II 
I 
I 
I 
Rank 
SumTest 
T+ 
35 
27 
31 
31 
25 
33 
Level 
of 
Significance 
.008(PI) 
.125(MM) 
.039(PI) 
.039(MM) 
.191(PI) 
.02(RE) 
B 
4-CC 
82 
13 
220 
-493 
- 
33 
- 
3853 
35 
65 
35 
5-CC 
159 
71 
389 
- 
580 
-72 
- 
2801 
25 
75 
25 
7 
133 
27 
83 
-1530 
- 
59 
-189 
28 
81 
57 
C 
8 
186 
5 
50 
-28  
-17 
-10 6 
79 
46 
54 
9 
136 
0 
83 
-1 
-1 
-1 
- 
- 
- 
Summary 
Statistics, 
SeriesB 
and 
C 
T 
_ 
_ 
_ 
_ 
_ 
___ 
_ 
_ 
_ 
_ 
_ 
_t 
Wilcoxon 
Signed 
II 
I 
-I 
I 
I 
Rank 
SumTest 
T+ 
15 
15 
10 
10 
8 
9 
Level 
of 
Significance 
.031(RE) 
.031(RE) 
.062(RE) 
.062(RE) 
.188(RE) 
.125(RE) 
aThe 
model 
favored 
by 
the 
data 
in 
each 
paired 
comparison 
is 
shown 
in 
parentheses. 
The 
level 
of 
significance 
is 
the 
probability 
of 
incorrectly 
rejecting 
the 
null 
hypothesis 
that 
both 
models 
predict 
equally 
well. 
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TABLE IV 
COMPARISON OF ACTUAL ALLOCATIONS WITH THE ALLOCATIONS PREDICTED BY THREE MODELS. 
CRITERION: PERCENT OF PREDICTED FLOW OF SECURITIES THAT 
ACTUALLY OCCURRED AT THE END OF EACH MARKETa 
Market Experiments Models 
Series Number Pi RE MM 
1 86 42 50 
2 19 46 47 
3 28 67 39 
A 4-S 17 17 5 
5-S -8 59 18 
6 12 42 -2 
10 7 21 11 
11 -7 10 -7 
Summary Statistics for Series A T T T T 
Wilcoxon Signed 
Rank Sum Text T+ 22 33 
Level of Significance .109(RE) .020(RE) 
B 4-CC 26 90 No Prediction 
5-CC 29 100 No Prediction 
7 18 No Prediction 48 
C 8 0 No Prediction 4 
9 18 No Prediction 25 
Summary Statistics for Series B and C T T T T 
Wilcoxon Signed 
Rank Sum Test T+ 13 9 
Level of Significance .048(RE) .100(RE) 
aThe model favored by the data in each paired comparison is shown in parentheses. The level of significance is the probability of 
incorrectly rejecting the null hypothesis that both models predict equally well. 
predicted to hold the securities by one model sometimes have a nonempty 
intersection with those predicted to hold by another model. On occasion the 
predictions by one are a subset of the predictions of another. In order to avoid 
some of the inherent problems associated with evaluating such models we chose 
to use the security transfers predicted by the models as opposed to the final 
holdings alone. Table IV reports the ratio: 
Ei E C.(X i j5~ )X10 
2j E C (Xj-5iX) xlO 
where Cm is the set of traders who are predicted by model m to hold the 
securities in equilibrium, x' is the predicted holding of trader i, and xi are as 
defined in Section 2.2 with the a and t suppressed. The measures are taken for 
the final occurrence of each state. 
Conclusion 3 (Allocation Predictions). In all series, allocations aggregated over 
the final occurrence of each state are more accurately predicted by the RE model 
than either the PI or MM. The RE model is more accurate in Series B (the RE 
makes no predictions in Series C) than it is in Series A. 
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Only in market 1 (Series A) is the prediction of the RE model substantially 
dominated by either of the other two and in this case it is dominated by both. In 
market 2 the RE model is dominated by only MM and then only by 1 percent, 
and in 4-S it is tied for first with PI, but in all others it is the best. Rank sum tests 
indicate significantly better performance for RE than MM (at a= .02) and 
marginally better than PI (at a = .109). In Series B the RE model accounts for 90 
to 100 percent of the security transfers. These predictions of the RE model are so 
accurate that it seems safe to conclude its superiority is not due to chance. In the 
contingent claims markets the MM model predicts zero price for all securities so 
traders would be indifferent about holdings. Consequently we indicate no predic- 
tions for the model. 
In Series C in which all traders have the same preference the price should equal 
the state dividend according to the RE model and all traders should be indiffer- 
ent between holding and not holding. Of the two remaining models MM seems 
marginally better. If, however, a slight transaction cost exists the RE model 
predicts zero trades. As can be seen in Figures 8 and 9 the value is lower in the 
later periods. 
TABLE V 
COMPARISON OF ACTUAL DISTRIBUTION OF PROFITS TO DISTRIBUTION PREDICTED BY THE THREE 
MODELS. CRITERION: SQUARED SUM OF DEVIATION FROM THE MEAN 
ACROSS INVESTORS AT THE END OF EACH MARKETa 
(in thousands) 
Market Experiments Models 
Series Number PI RE MM 
1 37 132 277 
2 140 29 125 
3 124 37 217 
A 4-S 181 65 76 
5-S 3101 564 962 
6 3049 2356 2877 
10 2033 954 622 
11 1007 551 593 
Summary Statistics for SeriesA T T T T 
Wilcoxon Signed 
Rank Sum Text T+ 34 30 
Level of Significance .012(RE) .055(RE) 
B 4-CC 907 6 242 
5-CC 2320 86 516 
7 387 47 340 
C 8 70 0 313 
9 328 0 333 
Summary Statistics for Series B and C T T T T 
Wilcoxon Signed 
Rank Sum Test T+ 15 15 
Level of Significance .031 (RE) .031 (RE) 
aThe model favored by the data in each paired comparison is shown in parentheses. The level of significance is the 
probability of incorrectly rejecting the null hypothesis that both models predict equally well. 
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Predictions of the distributions of profits across individual traders for each 
model are obtained by assuming that the predicted holders of securities buy up 
all securities at the predicted equilibrium price. Applied to the final occurrence of 
each state in each experiment, the sums of the square deviations from the mean 
are in Table V. 
Conclusion 4 (Profit Distribution). In all series the RE model is a significantly 
better predictor of the distribution of profits than either the PI model or the MM 
model. 
In every market except 1, in which the PI model was the best, and 10, in which 
the MM model was best, the error of the RE model is less than the error of either 
competitor. In Series B the error is very low and in Series C the error of the RE 
model is near zero. Order statistics applied to the ranking of models can be used 
to significantly reject both PI and MM in favor of RE. 
4.2. Efficiency and Information Aggregation 
Efficiency, as the term is applied here, is at 100 percent in a given period if and 
only if the total earnings of all traders are the maximum possible given the 
particular state that occurred in that period. For example, in market 3, all 
securities should be held by type II traders during periods in which the state 
was x because during these periods, type II traders receive larger dividends than 
type I. In market 4-CC, during periods when, say, state y occurred, type III 
traders should hold the y securities. In this way the total earning over all traders 
is maximized. For convenience the measure is truncated at no-trade earnings. 
That is, efficiency is zero if dividends paid equal the payment that would occur if 
no trades took place. Efficiencies are presented in Table VI. 
Conclusion 5. Efficiencies in the single security market are low relative to the 
nondiverse information experiments (Plott and Sunder, 1982) and relative to the 
contingent claims markets. 
Parametrically these markets are similar to those studied by Plott and Sunder 
(1982). The major difference is that in the 1982 study information aggregation 
was not necessary as the state was known with certainty by some traders. After a 
few periods those markets operated at near 100 percent efficiency for all states. 
On the other hand the efficiency of Series A markets averages only 47 percent. 
Interestingly enough, the efficiency of single security markets is lower (markets 
4-S, 5-S, 10, 11) when the experience of traders is greater. Series B markets, with 
a complete set of contingent claims, have substantially higher (around 90 percent) 
efficiency levels. 
Different models sometimes predict different levels of efficiency so efficiency 
can be used as a measure of model accuracy. Table VII contains the mean square 
errors for all models in all markets. Only Series A is useful because for Series B, 
PI and RE have identical predictions while MM makes no predictions. 
Conclusion 6. The rational expectations model is the least accurate predictor 
for the efficiency of Series A markets. 
The rank test leads directly to a rejection of the RE model when compared to 
either PI or MM. 
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We have no measure of the degree to which information was successfully 
aggregated in these markets. However, information aggregation is related to 
efficiency even though the precise relationship is unclear. If information is 
perfectly aggregated, then an application of supply and demand suggests that 
the markets should operate at 100 percent efficiency. Those traders who have the 
highest dividends should acquire the security. If information fails to be aggre- 
gated, then resources should be allocated according to the prior information 
model in which each trader is risk neutral and acts on privately received 
information alone. 
Conclusion 7. Information aggregation occurred in all markets in which the 
measurement can be made, except one. Furthermore, aggregation improved with 
replication of periods. 
The data are in Table VIII. Of the fifty-two periods in which the measurement 
can be made, all were positive except four. Three of the four periods of negative 
aggregation occurred in market 11 in which aggregation never occurred. A test on 
the changes in the aggregation index indicates that twenty out of thirty-two 
changes in aggregation index upon repetition of a state within the same market 
converged towards 100 percent. The probability of chance is 0.107. 
Unfortunately this aggregation measure cannot be applied to either Series B or 
C because those who would hold the securities on the basis of private informa- 
tion form a subset of those who would hold after full aggregation. The price 
behavior in the Series B and C markets suggests that the information in both 
series was almost perfectly aggregated. Otherwise, without aggregation, price 
would not have been so close to the rational expectations prices. Nevertheless, 
given our definitions and parameters, we are unable to provide an elegant 
demonstration of the degree of aggregation under the alternative institutional 
regimes. 
4.3. Initial Periods: Some Price Dynamics 
A study of the dynamics of these markets is obviously of highest priority. 
Unfortunately progress in impeded by two factors. First, the convergence behav- 
ior of even the simplest markets with no information aggregation is not well 
understood in spite of substantial progress (Easley and Ledyard (1986), Friedman 
(1984), Wilson (1982)). Secondly, the dynamic theory of information aggregation 
is similarly underdeveloped. 
A natural empirical approach is to inquire if convergence toward equilibrium is 
occurring across periods similar to the convergence commonly observed in simple 
markets. This question is also suggested by a model developed by James Jordan 
(1982). He studies a model of tatonnement adjustment in which agents first use 
private information to express demands during intital iterations but use the 
information implicit in those iterations in formulating expressed demands in later 
iterations. In his model, prices first converge to PI equilibria as temporary 
equilibria which provide sufficient information to permit the ultimate conver- 
gence to the REE. 
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TABLE VI 
EFFICIENCY a 
Market 
Experiment Period 
Series Number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
A 1 y x z z x z z y y z z 
100 -100 100 100 0 100 100 75 100 75 100 
2 y x y x z y y x x x y 
50 - 87.5 100 - 75 100 100 100 50 12.5 12.5 87.5 
3 x z x x z z y y z z x 
- 87.5 100 -62.5 37.5 100 100 12.5 50 100 100 25 
4-S z x 
26.5 26.7 
5-S x z 
17 48.5 
6 x x z y z z y x y x x 
71 - 27 31 25 54 65 78 64 71 -48 -55 
10 x x z y z z y x y x x 
-14 - 25 21 43 - 2 - 25 48 6 - 25 - 9 42 
11 z x x y x z y x z y x 
37.5 -3 46 -66 -17 74 -52 -2 100 -59 -9 
4-CC z z z x x y x y z 
B 74.3 96.3 100 88.8 100 100 86.2 88.75 100 
5-CC x z y y x x y x z 
26.3 81.6 100 76.2 100 100 100 100 100 
7 
C 8 Efficiency of uniform dividend markets is undefined. 
9 
Actual Dividends Paid - Zero-Trade Dividends 
Efficiency RE Dividends - Zero-Trade Dividends 
In our markets the PI equilibria contain sufficient information to reveal the 
state to half of the agents of each type. Once half of each type is informed, the 
REE is the only supportable equilibrium. A natural question then is whether 
prices evolve along a Jordan path from the PI to the REE. Clearly the Jordan 
model suggests that the evolution takes place within a period. However, empirical 
adjustments to equilibria are observed occurring across periods with bid/asks, 
etc., within periods providing additional information not captured by standard 
models.7 The question about dynamics is formalized by Conjecture 1. 
Conjecture 1. The markets adjust across periods (along a Jordan path) with the 
first occurrences of a state near the PI equilibrium and the last occurrence of a 
state near the REE. 
The measures of model accuracy that were made for the final periods and are 
reported in Table III were also made for the initial periods. At the beginning 
7Table of supporting data available from the authors. 
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Period 
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 Mean Median 
x z z x x z y y z 
25 100 100 - 50 - 75 100 87.5 100 100 69 100.0 
z z y y y x y y z y x z 
100 100 100 100 100 50 87.5 87.5 100 100 75 -37.5 73 93.7 
z z x x z y y z z 
100 100 37.5 62.5 100 62.5 37.5 50 100 78 62.5 
y z 
- 3.75 55.9 33 26.6 
z y z x y 
33.5 68.75 46.7 79.1 94.4 49 48.5 
y z y z 
75 71 97 65 46 65.0 
y z y z y x 
65 29 - 54 - 8 71 4 8 6.0 
z x 
100 -47.5 18 -3.0 
93 96.3 
87 100.0 
periods in series A the RE model is the worst of the three models and the PI 
model is marginally the best. However, if the difference between the measured 
error of a model in the first period and the measured error of the model in the 
last period is considered, the RE model clearly shows the greatest improvement. 
In this weak sense we find support for the conjecture. Of course, the fact that an 
RE was not achieved at the end of the series is an important fact that suggests 
that the conjecture might not capture the essential elements of the dynamics. 
The pooled data from Series B and C only yield some weak support for the 
conjecture. During the first periods the performance of the PI model is closer to 
the RE model than it was at the end periods, and in Series C the performance of 
the MM model was closer to the RE at the beginning than it was at the end. The 
fact that the RE model receives competition from these alternate models during 
the early stages but not at the end generates enough support for the spirit of the 
conjecture to justify further study in future experiments. 
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TABLE VII 
ABSOLUTE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE EFFICIENCY PREDICTED BY EACH MODEL 
AND THE OBSERVED EFFICIENCY AT THE END OF EACH MARKET a 
Market Experiments Models 
Series Number PI RE MM 
1 9 58 58 
2 46 21 21 
3 25 42 42 
A 4-S 74 74 22 
5-S 14 27 24 
6 19 64 10 
10 33 78 4 
11 61 106 32 
Summary Statistics for Series A T T T T 
Wilcoxon Signed 
Rank Sum Test T+ 25 15 
Level of Significance .039(PI) .031(MM) 
B 4-CC 8 8 
5-CC 0 0 
7 Efficiency of uniform dividend 
C 8 markets is undefined. 
aThe model favored by the data in each paired comparison is shown in parentheses. The level of significance is the 
probability of incorrectly rejecting the null hypothesis that both models predict equally well. 
4.4. Contingent Claims Price Dynamics and the Role of Bids 
In contingent claims markets with the diverse information structure traders 
who know, savy ihat state x has not occurred, know not only that the value of 
x-contingent security is zero to them, but they also know that its value is zero to 
all those who acquire this information. Making an offer to sell a security 
contingent upon the state that a trader knows has not occurred is a no-loss 
proposition if the trader expects the price to move toward zero. Buying any 
security on initial information involves some risk. It is reasonable to hypothesize 
that the first market action will be an offer (to sell) by a trader who knows the 
security is worth nothing. 
Hypothesis 1. The opening action in a market period is an offer to sell a 
contingent claim corresponding to one of the two states that has not occurred 
and is made by a trader who has prior information that the corresponding state 
has not occurred. 
Under the null hypothesis the opening action could occur in any of the three 
contingent claiihis markets, could be a bid or an offer, and could be made by any 
trader with the exception that the traders informed "not x" will not bid for 
x-contingent security and similarly for the other states. Thus, there is a two-out- 
of-ten or 20 percent probability that the events in Hypothesis 1 will occur by 
random chance. The event occurred in 12 of the 18 opportunities. The null 
hypothesis is rejected in favor of Hypothesis 1 at a = .0000. 
If the substance of Hypothesis 1 is true, then opening offers made in a 
contingent claims market corresponding to a state that has not occurred can, by a 
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TABLE VIII 
AGGREGATION INDEXa 
Market 
Experiment Period Converge 
Changes 
Series Number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 Median Within State 
1 x z z y y z z x z z x x z y y z 
69 - - 93 100 - - 77 - - 54 46 - 97 100 - 87 3 out of 5 
2 x z y y x x x y z z y y y x y y z y x z 
4 - 100 100 73 52 52 90 - - 100 100 100 73 90 90 - 100 86 - 90 5 out of 8 
3 x z z y y z z x z z x x z y y z z 
81 - 76 86 - - 77 - - 81 88 - 90 83 - - 82 4outof6 
4-S z x y z 0 
- 56-15 - 20 - 
A 5-S x z z y z x y 
30 - - 65 - 87 94 76 2outof2 
6 xxz y z z y x y x x y z y z 
--- 44 - - 83 - 78 - - 81 - 98 - 81 3outof4 
10 xx z y z z y x y x x y z y z y x y 
15 7 - - 30 - 19 57 - - -- 29 24 2outof5 Z 
11 zxx y x z y x z y x z x 
---- 24- - -13 - - -19 - - -19 loutof2 
4A 20 out of 32 
B 4B Aggregation Index is undefined for complete markets. a =0.107 
7 
C 8 Aggregation Index is undefined for uniform dividend markets. 
9 
Actual Dividends Paid - Dividends under PI Allocation 
aAggregation Index = ggregation ividends under RE Allocation - Dividends under PI Allocation 
Note that the Aggregation Index is undefined whenever RE and PI allocations are identical. This is always the case for the uniform dividends and contingent claims markets and is true for at C. 
least one of the three states in the other markets. 
L» 
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process of elimination, inform half the traders which state has occurred. Such 
newly informed traders will wish to buy the corresponding contingent security. 
Thus, the opening action in the contingent claims market corresponding to the 
realized state should be a bid (to buy). 
Hypothesis 2: The first action in the "state" market is a bid (to buy). 
Because the first action can be either a bid or an offer, probability that the first 
action in this market will be a bid by random chance is 50 percent. Again, the 
data rejected the null in favor of Hypothesis 2 at a = .001. 
Assume that state x has occurred and the first action is an offer to sell the 
y-contingent security. If this offer is interpreted by traders whose private infor- 
mation is "not z" to mean that the state is not y either, they would know that 
the state is x and will therefore be inclined to buy the x-contingent security. This 
reasoning leads to the third hypothesis about the behavior of bids and offers: 
Hypothesis 3: When the first action in the "state" market is preceded by action 
in only one of the two "not" markets, this first action (a bid by Hypothesis 2) 
will be by a trader whose private information is that the state corresponding to 
the second of the two "not" markets has not occurred. 
Because this action could be taken by traders with either of the two pieces of 
information and the number of traders with each piece of information is equal, 
the condition in Hypothesis 3 will be fulfilled by random chance 50 percent of 
the time. The null cannot be rejected by the data in favor of Hypothesis 3 
(a = .23). 
4.5. Fair Game Tests 
In the single security markets of Series A, the trading occurred at prices far 
from the RE equilibrium prices. However, such trading did not offer traders 
opportunity to make profits by using mechanical filter trading rules.8 The 
behavior of these markets is similar to the New York Stock Exchange in that it is 
difficult to discover mechanical trading rules that statistically beat the naive 
buy-and-hold strategy. In addition, in the single security markets of series A, a 
rule based on perfect knowledge of the RE equilibrium price in these markets 
does not beat the naive strategy. Markets in Series A are fair games but these 
markets are not near RE equilibrium. 
8 Buy-and-Hold: buy one certificate at opening transaction price of each period; liquidate at closing 
transaction price of each period. 
Trend Filter: observe transaction price trend from opening to the current price; if positive, buy if 
necessary to hold one certificate; if negative, sell if necessary to maintain a short position of one 
certificate. Liquidate at closing transaction price. 
y-Franc Filter: if transaction price goes up by y or more francs, buy if necessary to hold one 
certificate until the price goes down by y or more francs at which time sell, if necessary to maintain a 
short position of one certificate until the price goes up again by y or more francs. Liquidate at closing 
price. 
The filter rules were tested for values of y equal to 1, 5, and 25 francs respectively. None of the 
four filters (these three and the trend filter) yielded higher profits than the buy-and-hold rule for a 
majority of markets. 
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Markets in Series B and C converge to near the rational expectations prices. 
Buy and hold beats the filter rules in Series B and C but it is not as good as 
knowledge of the RE equilibrium price. We can make the following conclusion: 
Conclusion 8. The fair game property of security markets is a necessary but not 
a sufficient condition for the existence of RE prices. 
4.6. Other Variables 
The first few markets of Series A yielded a negative result on the ability of 
markets to aggregate information. The changes in variables in later markets 
represent probes of the possibility that some aspects of the structure of the 
markets or the procedures might be responsible for the negative results. The 
variables we perturbed were: (1) prior experience of subjects with RE phenome- 
non, (2) number of traders, and (3) volume of trading per person. Analysis of 
data led us to the following ex post conjectures about what additional experi- 
ments will show. 
Conjecture 2. Prior experience of traders with the RE phenomenon is not a 
sufficient condition for the single security market to arrive at the RE equilibrium. 
Conjecture 3. The increase in the number of trader types does not improve the 
RE formation process. 
Conjecture 4. Volume increases do not facilitate RE price formation. 
Collinearity of the three treatment variables would have to be handled more 
carefully, especially if the effect of experience, number of investor types, and 
volume on efficiency of these markets were positive. Given the lack of detectable 
effect of all of them on efficiency, our conjectures merely suggest that these 
treatment variables are unlikely to be of independent significance. 
5. WHY DO THE CONTINGENT CLAIMS MARKETS AGGREGATE INFORMATION BETTER? 
The title of this section states the overriding question that has emerged from 
the research. Three different types of explanations have occurred to us. 
The first potential explanation is that the single security markets are slow to 
adjust and that, given more time, these markets too will behave as predicted by 
the RE model. Indeed data exist that suggest the single security markets might 
ultimately attain a rational expectations equilibrium. In markets 3 the price in 
state z seems to be separating in spite of the remarkable counter-example 
provided by period 19 (see Figure 3). In markets 6 and 1 the price in state y 
appears to be separating near the end of these experiments. In market 11 the x 
state appears to be separated. But of course these signs that a willing eye can 
extract from the data must be considered with the seventeen periods of market 10 
where there seem to be no signs of separation. 
A second explanation rests on a comparison of the "size" of the message space. 
The message space of the contingent claims markets is larger than the message 
space of the single security markets in the sense that three sets of 
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bids/offers/prices are available to the traders in the former. The larger message 
space, according to this view, allows traders to establish a one-to-one message- 
state correspondence. The problem with the idea is Series C, for which the size of 
the message space was identical to that of Series A. Series C performed sub- 
stantially in accord with the RE models whereas Series A did not. If message 
space size alone was the problem with Series A, it should have surfaced also with 
Series C. 
The third explanation rests with the type of information implicit in the 
structure of the contingent claims used in these markets. A security paid a 
positive dividend only if a state occurred and paid zero otherwise; so strategic 
considerations aside, the purchase or sale of a security could be directly inter- 
preted as a belief about the occurrence of a particular state. Thus traders in the 
contingent claims markets had a "natural" knowledge about the preferences of 
other traders that was not present in the single security markets. 
The same type of information probably existed in the uniform dividend 
series C. If traders began with a presumption that other preferences are similar to 
their own, their initial assessment of others is correct in these markets. The 
knowledge bases of actions can then be inferred. 
This idea, that one key to market performance is a knowledge of others' 
preferences, is further supported by the analysis of bids discussed above. Traders 
seemed to use their knowledge of others' preferences in determining their own 
actions. The offer to sell the x security, for example, at the opening of a market 
seemed to be interpreted as a signal that the seller knew the state was not x. If, 
for example, the contingent claims were replaced by a "spanning" set of 
compound securities that were not "Arrow-Debreu" securities, then such an 
inference could not necessarily be made. On our belief about the behavior of 
these markets, information would not become perfectly aggregated with such a 
"6spanning" set of securities. 
These three ideas exhaust our current thinking on the subject. We are of the 
opinion that the key to understanding these markets rests in part with traders' 
beliefs of other traders' preferences. Some sort of knowledge of others' prefer- 
ences appears to be a necessary condition for aggregation of diverse information. 
However, our own understanding of the issue is so incomplete that we cannot 
even provide a precise conjecture. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The results have both positive and negative elements. On the positive side, 
experiments in the contingent claims markets (Series B) and in the uniform 
dividends markets (Series C) demonstrate that markets can aggregate diverse 
information in a manner consistent with rational expectations models. The 
markets in Series B and C are perhaps the very first demonstration that markets 
can simultaneously perform the independent functions of information aggrega- 
tion, information dissemination, and conflict resolution. 
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The negative results are of two forms. First as demonstrated by the markets in 
Series A, not all markets can be depended upon to behave in accord with the 
rational expectations model. The second negative result is that fair game tests 
used to check for efficient market behavior are not reliable indicators about when 
a market is operating efficiently. The markets in Series A were "fair games." That 
is, filter rules for potentially profitable trades worked no better than "buy and 
hold," so the tests indicated that the markets were efficient. However, these 
markets were not operating efficiently in a rational expectations sense. Markets 
that are "fair games" are not necessarily efficient. 
A comparison of the single security markets in Series A with the contingent 
claims markets of Series B that had substantially the same economic parameters 
demonstrates the importance of market institutions and instruments. The intro- 
duction of a complete set of Arrow-Debreu securities transformed a market that 
was operating inefficiently into a market that rapidly achieved a rational expecta- 
tions equilibrium. 
Exactly why the contingent claims instruments produced such a dramatic effect 
is an open question. Series C demonstrates that a single security will perform 
according to the RE model if all traders have similar preferences. An analysis of 
the bids in the contingent claims markets suggests that traders used implicit 
information about others' preferences. These two series together suggest that 
some knowledge about other traders' preferences may be a necessary condition 
for the operation of rational expectations principles in markets. 
California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA, 91125, U.S.A 
and 
University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, 55455, U.S.A. 
Manuscript received May, 1985; final revision received September, 1987. 
APPENDIX 
Markets were conducted in four steps: (1) training with the mechanism used to draw states of 
nature; (2) training with the mechanism to distribute diverse information; (3) explanation of 
procedures and rules of the market; and (4) conduct of markets for several periods. 
Step 1 of the procedure has been described in Plott and Sunder (1982, p. 693). The only change 
was from two to three states of the world. 
In order to train subjects with the mechanism to distribute diverse information in the second step 
of the experiment, the experimenter drew a ball from the bingo cage, recorded the state drawn, 
consulted the master clue sheet, and called out the row and column numbers of the cell on the 
subjects' clue sheet that contained each subject's clue. 
In advance of the experiment, a complete list of all possible ways of dividing a group of an even 
number of investors into two equal groups (for n = 12, this number is (1/2)nCn/2 =462) was 
prepared. These combinations were randomly ordered. One combination beginning from the top of 
this list was used each period to distribute information among the investors and none were repeated 
because the number of periods in any one experiment never exceeded 23. A coin toss determined the 
distribution of information about the unrealized states between the two groups. A separate clue sheet 
was designed for each investor along with a master clue sheet for the experimenter. 
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CLUE SHEET 
Columns 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 not y not x not z not y not x not z 
2 not x not y not x not z not z not y 
After determining the realized state, the experimenter called out the row and column number of the 
clue sheet which contained the private information of each investor. This method provided quick, 
confidential, and open means of communicating diverse information to all market participants. 
Training with this clue sheet was continued for eight to ten draws until all subjects were familiar 
with the mechanism. A show of hands after each draw of the training session revealed that the state 
was known to the group and that the information was randomly distributed. 
Steps 3 and 4 also were essentially similar to those described as Steps 2 and 3 respectively in Plott 
and Sunder (1982) with appropriate modifications to the instructions in order to incorporate diverse 
information and contingent claims when necessary. 
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